The number of transnational corporations - including parent companies and subsidiaries - has exploded over the last forty years, which has led to a correlating rise of corporate violations of international human rights and environmental laws, either directly or in conjunction with government security forces, local police, state-run businesses, or other businesses. In this work, Gwynne Skinner details the harms of business-related human rights violations on local communities and describes the barriers, both functional and institutional, that victims face (...) in seeking remedies. She concludes by offering solutions to these barriers, with a focus on measures designed to improve judicial remedies, which are the heart of international human rights law but often fail to deliver justice to victims. This work should be read by anyone concerned with the role of corporations in our increasingly globalized society. (shrink)

In the current study we compared academic locus of control (ALoC) and perceived quality of academic life (PQAL) across three groups of university students: those without disabilities, those with attention deficit disorder or learning disabilities (ADD-LD), and those with other disabilities. Results showed no significant differences in ALoC scores, with each group reporting an internal ALoC. However, students with other disabilities (e.g., sensory, motor, chronic health, and/or mental health) reported significantly lower satisfaction with their overall quality of academic life than (...) students without disabilities. Applied implications are discussed along with recommendations for further research. (shrink)

Two lecture styles were examined to determine which was more effective for enhancing content learning in college students. The same experienced guest lecturer presented information about bipolar disorder (a combination of depression and mania) to college students in human service-related fields. Students in classes assigned to the control group received a standard, didactic lecture. In classes assigned to the experimental group, the presenter began the lecture by informing the students that she had bipolar disorder and enhanced the standard didactic lecture (...) by interspersing descriptions of her personal experiences living with bipolar disorder. Content-specific pre-tests and post-tests developed by the researchers were used to compare acquisition of knowledge about the disorder across groups of students. Results showed that students who received the personal/experiential lecture acquired significantly more knowledge about bipolar disorder than did students who received the standard, didactic lecture. Theories and procedures that may enhance student learning and thinking in related areas are discussed. (shrink)

Juin 2010. Dans sa conférence inaugurale à l'université de Londres, Quentin Skinner soulève une question centrale : quel rôle la vérité des croyances étudiées doit-elle jouer dans l'effort visant à les expliquer? En soutenant que l'historien ou l'anthropologue ne doit pas s'intéresser à la vérité des croyances mais plutôt à leur rationalité, Quentin Skinner mobilise, défend et illustre certains des principes méthodologiques qui ont fait de lui le chef de file de l'"école de Cambridge" et renouvelé en profondeur (...) le paysage de l'histoire intellectuelle. (shrink)

A total of 1918 loci, detected by the hybridization of 938 expressed sequence tag unigenes from 26 Triticeae cDNA libraries, were mapped to wheat homoeologous group 4 chromosomes using a set of deletion, ditelosomic, and nulli-tetrasomic lines. The 1918 EST loci were not distributed uniformly among the three group 4 chromosomes; 41, 28, and 31% mapped to chromosomes 4A, 4B, and 4D, respectively. This pattern is in contrast to the cumulative results of EST mapping in all homoeologous groups, as reported (...) elsewhere, that found the highest proportion of loci mapped to the B genome. Sixty-five percent of these 1918 loci mapped to the long arms of homoeologous group 4 chromosomes, while 35% mapped to the short arms. The distal regions of chromosome arms showed higher numbers of loci than the proximal regions, with the exception of 4DL. This study confirmed the complex structure of chromosome 4A that contains two reciprocal translocations and two inversions, previously identified. An additional inversion in the centromeric region of 4A was revealed. A consensus map for homoeologous group 4 was developed from 119 ESTs unique to group 4. Forty-nine percent of these ESTs were found to be homoologous to sequences on rice chromosome 3, 12% had matches with sequences on other rice chromosomes, and 39% had no matches with rice sequences at all. Limited homology was found between wheat ESTs on homoeologous group 4 and the Arabidopsis genome. Forty-two percent of the homoeologous group 4 ESTs could be classified into functional categories on the basis of blastX searches against all protein databases. (shrink)

L'auteur montre que la définition par Hobbes de la liberté comme absence d'obstacle physique est liée à des convictions métaphysiques mais aussi à des prises de positions politiques, à l'encontre de la tradition antique ou des critiques que certains de ses contemporains adressaient au "Parlement Croupion".

A polemical and reductionist critical response to Skinner and Pocock has inhibited an appreciation of the true potential of their historiographical discussions for the practice of political theories. An important step in understanding the history of political thought in its duality - as both being about acts of political discourse over time and as itself being political - is to recognize the "traditionary" nature of discursive acts. Following Pocock and Skinner, we should speak not of tradition as objects (...) carried on, but of the nature of that carrying on, that activity of handing down through language. A traditionary act involves subscription to a fairly sophisticated account of the development of a particular form of practices through time and the identification by the actor of his act as part of that development. This subscription allows us to overcome the categorical dichotomies such as history versus philosophy, autonomy of texts versus ideas as expressions of social relations, voluntarism versus determinism, and language as either restrictive or instrumental, which underlie much of the contemporary methodological dispute. (shrink)

Both as historian and as theoretician, Quentin Skinner has contributed brilliantly to our understanding of the tradition of political thinking and to the renewed interest in a genuinely historical reading of the texts of that tradition. Until now, however, Skinner's methodological articles have not been conveniently available under one cover. James Tully's excellent volume remedies that deficiency. Tully brings together five of Skinner's most important writings on interpretation, his own fine introduction to Skinner's work, seven essays (...) by critics, and a long reply by Skinner, in which he responds to virtually all the criticisms of his work that have appeared in print. No one seriously interested in intellectual history, the history of philosophy, or the history of political thought can afford to miss this book. (shrink)

This paper offers some comments about the subject matter of Skinner's book Verbal Behavior (1957). It first presents an argument against the common misconception that Verbal Behavior is about language. It then discusses the nature of verbal behavior as a subdivision of op?rant .behavior. Following that, the paper identifies three aspects of the concept of verbal behavior that need some clarification. Finally, the paper concludes by pointing out that the significance of Verbal Behavior lies most centrally in its effort (...) to offer a better way of talking about one part of psychology's subject matter. (shrink)

Quentin Skinner’s appropriation of speech act theory for intellectual history has been extremely influential. Even as the model continues to be important for historians, however, philosophers now regard the original speech act theory paradigm as dated. Are there more recent initiatives that might reignite theoretical work in this area? This article argues that the inferentialism of Robert Brandom is one of the most interesting contemporary philosophical projects with historical implications. It shows how Brandom’s work emerged out of the broad (...) shift in the philosophy of language from semantics to pragmatics that also informed speech act theory. The article then goes on to unpack the rich implications of Brandom’s inferentialism for the theory and practice of intellectual history. It contends that inferentialism clarifies, legitimizes, and informs intellectual historical practice, and it concludes with a consideration of the challenges faced by inferentialist intellectual history, together with an argument for the broader implications of Brandom’s work. (shrink)

Proposed as an alternative political philosophy to liberalism, contemporary republicanism articulates a systematic theory of freedom as non-domination. Does it make sense, however, to think about the difference between liberals and republicans along the lines of freedom? This article answers in the negative, maintaining that the distinction is purchased at the cost of misdescribing liberal theory. Focusing on the work of Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit, I maintain that the mischaracterization takes place at two levels. The first is the (...) link that is drawn between Thomas Hobbes and classical and contemporary liberals. The second has to do with republicans' refusal to acknowledge the normative framework in which liberal freedom takes root and is made politically defensible. This framework, I argue, comprises a constellation of other concepts, such as consent, publicity, and the rule of law that are part and parcel of liberal freedom. Once these features are taken into consideration, what emerges is a view of liberalism that means something less than being free from any and all constraints, but which also means something more than being free from actual interference. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose that influential arguments of Jacques Derridas's and Judith Butler's rely on behaviorism and relativism, a reliance which has implications for, among other things, the issue of hate speech. I begin with a brief discussion of the philosophy of W. V. O. Quine, a thinker seldom discussed in relationship to continental poststructuralism. Quine is interesting because he explicitly defends an ontological relativism combined with linguistic behaviorism, the latter as influenced by B. F. Skinner and John (...) Watson. I then show that Butler's and Derrida's theories demonstrate a similar yet unacknowledged lineage. I devote the final section of the paper to a discussion of hate speech, and the problematization of behaviorism and relativism it entails. (shrink)

Radical Behaviorism makes the implausible claim that “the appeal to mind explains nothing at all” (Skinner 1971, p. 186). Clearly, such a claim (if accepted) would lend strong support to the Skinnerian research program, if only because it would eliminate the major competition. But what support remains when such a claim is not accepted? This paper shall argue that the Skinnerian research program need not depend upon the supposition that there is something scientifically illicit or vacuous about the explanations (...) offered by mentalistic psychology. Distinguishing Radical Behaviorism from a position that grows out of Skinner’s writings from 1938 through 1950, it asserts that the latter position provides a conception of the behavior analytic program that is compatible with the basic claims of cognitive and folk psychology.We may give a rough definition of this position by following Cummins (1983) in distinguishing between two types of scientific theory. (shrink)

Religion and Community: Adam Smith on the Virtues of Liberty CHARLES L. GRISWOLD, JR. The good temper and moderation of con- tending factions seems to be the most es- gential circumstance in the publick morals of a free people. Adam Smith' THE ARCHITECTS of what one might call "classical" or "Enlightenment" liberal- ism saw themselves as committed to refuting the claims to political sovereignty by organized religion. ~ The arguments against the legitimacy of a state- supported religion, and, in the (...) extreme case, of a religious monopoly, are so integral a part of the Enlightenment's effort to put politics on a stable and just foundation as to constitute one of the controlling themes of the period. Lib- eral politics requires toleration, or better, liberty of religious belief. And this in turn requires that religious institutions be privatized, as it were, and that just politics be secularized in that legitimate rule is to lie in the consent of the ruled rather than in the laws of God as interpreted by his ministers on earth. Differ- ' Wealth of Nations V.i.f.4o. My references to The Wealth of Nations are to the two-volume R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner edition . 2 The list of thinkers in the "classical liberal" tradition simply reads as the list of key Enlighten- ment figures: Bayle, Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, Hume, Smith, Voltaire, and Kant, to name a few. Consider the role that religious freedom plays in Kant's. (shrink)

Scholars studying classic political texts face an important decision: Should these texts be read as artifacts of history or as sources for still-valid insights about politics today? Competing historical and “presentist” approaches to political thought do not have a methodological dispute—that is, a disagreement about the most effective scholarly means to an agreed-upon end. They instead have an ethical dispute about the respective value of competing activities that aim at different purposes. This article examines six ethical arguments, drawn primarily from (...) the work of Quentin Skinner, in favor of the historical approach. It concludes that while both intellectual history and presentist theory are ethically justifiable, the best justification of the former enterprise is that it can help us achieve the purposes of the latter. (shrink)

Kateb poses as a defender of an actually attainable utopia and considers some recent attacks on this idea. He finds flaws in various arguments against any use of violence in attaining utopia, denies that utopian government need be highly authoritarian or machine-guided, and shows the immorality of certain "aesthetic" objections to life in utopia. While condemning theories of indeterminism, he sympathizes with expressions of hostility to utopian psychologists, such as B. F. Skinner, who would like "conditioning" to supersede older (...) forms of being virtuous. The author makes good use of a wide range of works in philosophy and the social sciences, maintains a high level of argumentation, and displays great respect for most of his anti-utopian opponents.--W. L. M. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous cherchons à penser les enjeux philosophiques et politiques de l’application des méthodes interprétatives en histoire de la philosophie politique. À partir d’une étude de l’interprétation de Machiavel développée par Quentin Skinner, nous interrogeons la relation entre l’exposition théorique de sa méthodologie et son application effective à la pensée machiavélienne. Dans un premier temps, nous exposons les fondements du contextualisme skinnérien, en insistant d’une part sur sa critique des méthodes orthodoxes en histoire des idées, et d’autre (...) part, sur sa conception de l’intentionnalité d’un auteur du passé et sur la relation étroite entre théorie politique et vie politique qu’elle présuppose. Dans un second temps, nous analysons la mise en œuvre de cette méthode à partir du cas Machiavel, en illustrant les résultats féconds ainsi que les limites d’une telle théorie interprétative. Nous terminons par une analyse critique du projet politique qui sous-tend l’application de cette herméneutique. La thèse défendue est que la relation entre la dimension méthodologique et la dimension proprement politique de l’entreprise skinnérienne est marquée par une certaine tension. D’un côté, Skinner affirme que l’historien ne peut, et ne doit, retirer de leçons intemporelles de l’étude des auteurs du passé; la notion même de continuité entre les époques – l’idée d’une « grande Tradition » – serait un leurre. De l’autre, il critique la conception négative de la liberté mise de l’avant par des auteurs tels que John Rawls ou Isaiah Berlin, et propose une vision renouvelée du républicanisme qui puiserait à la source machiavélienne et permettrait de réconcilier liberté individuelle et participation citoyenne. En explorant tour à tour ces deux volets et l’articulation parfois problématique entre les deux, nous interrogeons la nature de cette équivoque entre les visées méthodologiques de Skinner en tant qu’historien des idées et son propos en tant que théoricien politique. (shrink)

This paper examines the methodological propositions of Quentin Skinner, whose influence on intellectual history, including the history and philosophy of science (HPS), cannot be disregarded. It is well known that Skinner’s method is based on John L. Austin’s theory of speech acts. Nonetheless, the very idea of applying ordinary language philosophy to the subject matter of history rests on other assumptions that form Skinner’s philosophy of historiography. The paper focuses on reconstructing this philosophy of historiography and especially (...) on R. G. Collingwood as a primary source of inspiration. This famous British philosopher, historian, and archaeologist authored many inspirational texts concerning the historical craft. The complex and sometimes contradictory structure of his posthumously published texts requires careful interpretation, and many philosophers see Collingwood as an obscure thinker. The paper argues that even though Skinner openly denounces Collingwood’s central concept of re-enactment, his philosophy of historiography is deeply influenced by a specific understanding of Collingwood’s legacy. (shrink)

Comment la critique de Q. Skinner adressée aux historiens essentialistes et contextualistes de la pensée politique lui permet-elle de justifier, à partir d’une certaine lecture de J. L. Austin, le recours à ce qu’il appelle l’« intention illocutoire » de l’auteur. La mise au jour d’une telle intention devant permettre de décrire positivement l’ensemble des relations existant entre un texte et son contexte. De quel contexte s’agit-il? Le critère de l’intention permet-il, valablement, de se substituer au critère de la (...) convention chez Austin? (shrink)

Although first published in 1969, the methodological views advanced in Quentin Skinner's “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” remain relevant today. In his article Skinner suggests that it would be inappropriate to even attempt to write the history of any idea or concept. In support of this view, Skinner advances two arguments, one derived from the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein and the other from that of J. L. Austin. In this paper I focus on (...) the first of these arguments. I claim that the conclusion which Skinner draws from this particular argument does not necessarily follow and that an alternative assessment of the methodological significance of Wittgenstein's philosophy for historians of ideas is possible. On this alternative view, far from ruling out conceptual history, an appeal to the view of meaning set out in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations leads to a quite different conclusion, namely that the writing of such a history is arguably a necessary precondition for the elucidation of the meaning of a number of the core concepts in the canon of the history of political thought. Skinner's views have changed somewhat since 1969. Indeed, from the mid 1970s onwards he came to relax the strict opposition to the idea of conceptual history to which he was then committed. The paper concludes by noting that this evolution in Skinner's thinking has made him much more sympathetic than anybody reading “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” would have imagined to the research project of the Begriffgeschichte School of conceptual history. (shrink)

D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (1976) II An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner; textual editor W. B. Todd, 2 vols. (1976) III Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed. W. P. D. Wightman  ...

Although first published in 1969, the methodological views advanced in Quentin Skinner's “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” remain relevant today. In his article Skinner suggests that it would be inappropriate to even attempt to write the history of any idea or concept. In support of this view, Skinner advances two arguments, one derived from the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein and the other from that of J. L. Austin.In this paper I focus on the (...) first of these arguments. I claim that the conclusion which Skinner draws from this particular argument does not necessarily follow and that an alternative assessment of the methodological significance of Wittgenstein's philosophy for historians of ideas is possible. On this alternative view, far from ruling out conceptual history, an appeal to the view of meaning set out in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations leads to a quite different conclusion, namely that the writing of such a history is arguably a necessary precondition for the elucidation of the meaning of a number of the core concepts in the canon of the history of political thought.Skinner's views have changed somewhat since 1969. Indeed, from the mid 1970s onwards he came to relax the strict opposition to the idea of conceptual history to which he was then committed. The paper concludes by noting that this evolution in Skinner's thinking has made him much more sympathetic than anybody reading “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” would have imagined to the research project of the Begriffgeschichte School of conceptual history. (shrink)

Comment la critique de Q. Skinner adressée aux historiens essentialistes et contextualistes de la pensée politique lui permet-elle de justifier, à partir d’une certaine lecture de J. L. Austin, le recours à ce qu’il appelle l’« intention illocutoire » de l’auteur. La mise au jour d’une telle intention devant permettre de décrire positivement l’ensemble des relations existant entre un texte et son contexte. De quel contexte s’agit-il? Le critère de l’intention permet-il, valablement, de se substituer au critère de la (...) convention chez Austin? (shrink)

When J. L. Austin introduced two “shining new tools to crack the crib of reality”—the theory of performative utterances and the doctrine of infelicities—he could not have imagined that he was also about to inaugurate a shining new industry in the philosophy of the social sciences. But with its evident concern for the features to which “all acts are heir which have the general character of ritual or ceremonial,” Austin’s theory soon became indispensable in the analysis of ritual, linguistic and (...) every kind of social action. While Indianists such as Frits Staal, Bimal Matilal and David Seyfort Ruegg have made good use of the work of Austin and his “ordinary language” school, it is Quentin Skinner who has attempted to turn Austin’s insights into a general “theory and method” for the study of intellectual cultures. The question I want to address in this paper has to do with the applicability of Skinnerian techniques to the study of literary and intellectual Sanskrit culture in premodern India. If not all of Skinner’s methods transfer to the new context, identification of the points at which they breakdown helps to clarify the distinctive contours of Indian intellectual history, and suggests appropriate methodological innovation. (shrink)

This article argues that the relationship between analytical philosophy and the philosophy of intellectual history is conceptually uneasy and even antagonistic once the general philosophical viewpoints, and some particular topics, of the two perspectives are drawn out and compared. The article critically compares the philosophies of Quentin Skinner and Mark Bevir with the philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, W.V.O. Quine and Donald Davidson. Section I compares the way in which these two perspectives view the task of philosophy. Section (...) II points to a critical difficulty in Bevir and Skinner’s use of analytical philosophy in their discussions on objectivity. In section III, another such critical juncture is identified in the topic of explanation. Finally, section IV suggests an interpretation for the character of the comparison. (shrink)

Behaviorism was a peculiarly American phenomenon. As a school of psychology it was founded by John B. Watson (1878-1958) and grew into the neobehaviorisms of the 1920s, 30s and 40s. Philosophers were involved from the start, prefiguring the movement and endeavoring to define or redefine its tenets. Behaviorism expressed the naturalistic bent in American thought, which came in response to the prevailing philosophical idealism and was inspired by developments in natural science itself. There were several versions of naturalism in American (...) philosophy, and also several behaviorisms. Most behaviorists paid homage to Darwinian functionalism; all forswore introspection and made learned changes in behavior the primary subject matter and explanatory domain of psychology. They differed in their descriptions of behavior, modes of explanation, and attitudes toward mentalistic concepts. Watson was a strict materialist who wanted to eliminate all mentalistic talk from psychology. Edward Chace Tolman (1886-1959) regarded mind as a biological function of the organism. He permitted mentalistic terms such as 'purpose' in behavioral description, and posited intervening processes that included 'representations' of the environment, while requiring such processes be studied only as expressed in behavior. Clark L. Hull (1884-1952) developed a hypothetical-deductive version of behaviorism, akin to Tolman's functionalism in positing intervening variables but without his cognitivist constructs. B. F. Skinner (1904-90) rejected intervening variables and developed his own account of the behavior of the whole organism, based on the laws of operant conditioning. The naturalism in American philosophy of the early twentieth century showed respect for the natural sciences, especially biology and psychology. John Dewey (1896, 1911), George Santayana (1905, 1920), and F. J. E. Woodbridge (1909, 1913) expressed this attitude. It animated the neorealism of E. B. Holt and Ralph Barton Perry, who gave special attention to psychology, and the evolutionary naturalism and critical realism of Roy Wood Sellars. This naturalism differed from Watson's in regarding mind as part of nature from a Darwinian and functionalist perspective, and treating behavior as the product of the mental functioning. It fed Tolman's version of behaviorism. It was not materialistic or physical-reductionist. Only later, with Quine and logical empiricism, was behaviorism seen as essentially physicalistic. (shrink)

Plusieurs L'Ont déjà dit. Marx, Freud, Lévi-Strauss, Skinner, par exemple, l'ont affirmé d'une façon ou d'une autre. On peut toutefois se demander s'ils l'ont vraiment pense, ou si, plutot, ils ne voyaient pas comment il serait possible á l'homme d'intervenir dans le cours du monde. Personne ne semble avoir voulu pousser tres loin, ni tres longtemps, 1'interrogation et la recherche a ce propos, avec le resultat qu'on s'en tient a des affirmations — tout au plus a des croyances — (...) sur la possibilité ou, au contraire, l'impossibilité que l'homme intervienne dans le monde physique, psychologique, ou social, pour le changer. (shrink)

This book sets out to identify the nature and implications of a proper understanding of pluralism in a original and illuminating way. Isaiah Berlin believed that a recognition of pluralism is vital to a free, decent and civilised society. By looking below at the often neglected foundations of Berlin’s celebrated account of moral pluralism, Lyons reveals the more philosophically profound aspects of his undogmatic and humanistic liberal vision. He achieves this by comparing Berlin’s core ideas with those of several of (...) his most distinguished philosophical contemporaries, an exercise which yields not only a deeper grasp of Berlin and several major twentieth-century thinkers, principally A. J. Ayer, J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, Bernard Williams and Quentin Skinner, but, more broadly, a keener appreciation of the power of history and philosophy to help us make sense of our predicament. (shrink)

This annotated commentary of Pêcheux's materialist theory of discourse anticipates the formation of a real social science which supersedes the metaphysical meanings of the empirical ideologies 'always-already-there'. Structures of Language presents Pêcheux's theory in reference to Ferdinand de Saussure's epistemological breakthrough that founded the science of linguistics : the theoretical separation of sound from meaning. Noam Chomsky's generative grammar, John Searle's philosophy of language, B.F. Skinner's indwelling agents, J.L. Austin's speech situations, Lacan's symbolic order, and the influential theories of (...) other linguistic researchers, are cited to explain the functioning of semantic ideology. (shrink)

​The motivation for this volume is simple. For a variety of reasons, clinical psychologists have long shown considerable interest in the philosophy of science. When logical positivism gained currency in the 1930s, psychologists were among the most avid readers of what these philosophers had to say about science. Part of the critique of Skinner’s radical behaviorism and thus behavior therapy was that it relied on, and thus was logically dependent on, the truth of logical positivism—a claim decisively refuted both (...) historically and logically by L.D. Smith (1986) in his important Behaviorism and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment of the Alliance. ​. (shrink)

Martin highlights the degree to which H. L. A. Hart’s legal positivism relies on Hobbesian assumptions. Like Hart, Hobbes combines utilitarian and retributivist elements. The best way to make sense of Hobbes’s theory of punishment is to follow Quentin Skinner and view both the “sovereign” and the “state” as distinct legal fictions. Unlike Hobbes, Hart asserts these fictions as facts. As a result, Hart’s philosophy of criminal law in Punishment and Responsibility is in tension with his legal philosophy in (...) The Concept of Law. Martin worries that Hart’s mixed theory is untenable: the utilitarian element threatens to overtake his core retributivist thesis. Ultimately, however, neither Hart nor Hobbes has the resources to explain why the autonomous individual matters in the context of criminal law. (shrink)